In The Shia Revival, author Vali Nasr offers a metanarrative for contextualizing and understanding trends and events in the post-Saddam Middle East— and it is one that predates American hegemony and even Western regional influence. The conflict between Islam’s two main sects, Sunnism and Shi’ism, will shape the future order of the Middle East, upsetting centuries-old Sunni predominance and increasing Iran’s clout, according to Nasr. In this seminal 2006 work, Nasr outlines the history and identity of the two sects, before moving on to watershed moments in the modern age, such as the Islamic Republic and the Second Gulf War. Finally, he concludes with some explanations for how Shias around the Middle East will react to the Shia Revival, and offers predictions for the future.
The Islamic Revolution serves as one of the two most seminal points in Nasr’s explanation of the Shia revival phenomenon. The Shia world welcomed this revolution with great pride, especially because Shias had achieved the goals of Islamic Statehood that Sunni activists like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e Islami had fought for in vain for so long. The revolution not only sent a symbolic message of Shia empowerment, but it also led to the empowerment of avowedly Shia movements across the Middle East, many of which received financial and political support from Tehran.
Nasr also writes that a big part of the Shia Revival is the rise of Iran in recent years. However, one must temper his somewhat one-sided case for this trend. The author focuses on the increased role of Qom as a religious institution, taking over Najaf, as a harbinger of Iran’s rise. Indeed, while this trend has taken place, it must be added that this has helped to bolster Iran’s soft power (its ability to obtain what it wants through co-option and attraction), rather than its hard power (its ability to obtain through coercion or payment). Certainly, Iran has assumed greater regional leadership over the Middle East’s recently awakened Shia. However, its hard power, including Iran’s economy and military may be a different story. Nasr writes that with the US toppling of Saddam and the Taliban, “the collapse of the Sunni wall freed Iran to expand its regional influence at a time when the country vibrant cultural and economic scene demands greater expression.” Again, this may be overly‑optimistic with regard to Iran, especially considering the degree to which Iran has been isolated, culminating in ever‑stricter unilateral as well as multilateral sanctions legislation. Additionally, the economy of the Islamic Republic is plagued by high inflation rates and its nuclear program has yet to achieve desired levels of enrichment or even be integrated into the electrical power grid. Indeed, Nasr is right that Iran is rising regionally, but it would be prudent to add that it is a rise impeded by many obstacles and constraints along the way.
Finally, Vali Nasr offers a few predictions toward the end of the book. He writes that since Saudi Arabia is the US’ closest ally and is viewed as complicit in the Shia revival, the House of Saud may be undermined. Riyadh can no longer claim to be sustaining Sunni dominance, which has decreased its religious legitimacy, essentially. Nasr then says that the “Shia Revival in Iraq…may well lead to regime change in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region.” Thus far, the prediction about Saudi Arabia has not materialized nor has it offered any possible signs of taking place. Indeed, while much of the rest of the Arab world is in a state of turmoil, Saudi Arabia’s kingdom seems to be relatively stable, bolstered by high oil prices. On the other hand, his prediction has proven to be rather prescient in the face of events in Bahrain, with the Shia majority rising up against the Sunni government and al‑Khalifa leadership. However, it must be noted that this is a rather safe prediction in the case of Bahrain, as the Shia majority have been involved in every anti‑government agitation in that island country.
Certainly, the so‑called Arab Spring offers an interesting test for Nasr’s analysis and predictions. The most revealing scenario perhaps is in the case of Egypt, one of the most important states of the Middle East. Nasr wrote in 2006, “it was not the battle of liberty against oppression but rather the age‑old battle of the two halves of Islam, Shias and Sunnis. This was the conflict that Iraq has rekindled and this is the conflict that will shape the future.” Yet in the case of Egypt, with a month of mostly peaceful demonstrations and the ouster of an aging dictator, that has not been the case. It was, in fact, a battle of liberty, embodied in young protestors clamoring for jobs and freedom, over oppression embodied in a mostly‑discredited government ruled by the same man for thirty years. The Shia‑Sunni divide did not seem to play much of a role in shaping the future in this heavily Sunni populated country, often seen as a leader of the Arab world.
Overall, The Shia Revival outlines an extremely important Middle Eastern trend, one that will have reverberations for the contemporary history of Shiism and Islam as well as for the politics and economics of the constituent states of the region. Additionally, it is not only the states of the region that are taking notice, but the foreign policy circles of other states as well. It must be the case that the United States has taken notice of this Shia empowerment, as author Vali Nasr was tapped to become a State Department advisor since the publication of The Shia Revival. He concludes on an optimistic note that Shias and Sunnis will eventually look for ways to reach a state of peace, and that this will occur primarily through a distribution of power and resources that reflects the demographic realities. With his new government position, one can hope that his analysis and policy proposals help to hasten this equilibrium.
[NOTE: This is a shortened version of a longer book review. For the long form book review click here]