Stephen Kinzer
A 1987 painting (below) best captures the lamentable Iranian themes of Mossadegh’s overthrow within the borders of a single frame: Persian victimhood and the perniciousness of outside forces committed to setting the country ablaze. This painting by Hossein Rashtian depicts the shape of Iran entirely on fire while grotesque demons attack it from all angles, replete with ominous clouds in the background. These themes, well engrained in the history and popular imagination of the Iranian people, are key to understanding the perception of the events of August 1953 as well as the course of US-Iran relations since. Kinzer’s book, “All the Shah’s Men”, does a fantastic job of neatly organizing and articulating the various forces at play, historical events, and broader significance of this seminal point in Iranian history and relations with the United States.
As Kinzer explains, in the early 1950s, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now British Petroleum) was an immensely profitable company, with the Abadan refinery constituting Britain’s largest overseas asset, the largest installation of its kind in the world, and a source of British pride. While the refinery produced great profits and provided black gold for the Royal Navy, Iran owned only 20% of the company and many of its people, including the oil refinery workers, lived in poverty. It was within this dichotomy that Mohammad Mossadegh, an aristocrat of the former Qajar dynasty, became a leader in the calls for nationalizing the AIOC.
After failures to reach a compromise between the oil company and the Prime Minister Razmara, Mossadegh formed a powerful alliance with Ayatollah Kashani, an influential religious figure, and was elected prime minister in 1951. Despite the loud and frequent objections of Great Britain, on May 15, 1951 the Prime Minister declared the AIOC irrevocably dissolved.
Although some in the British government wanted to invade Iran as a response, Prime Minister Clement Attlee was categorically opposed; instead an embargo on the company was unilaterally installed and the case was taken up at the United Nations. The British government argued that the oil was theirs because they had discovered, exploited, refined, transported, and marketed the oil. While Mossadegh led a delegation to speak at the UN, he met with Truman administration officials who sympathized somewhat with the Iranian government and worked in vain to achieve a compromise between nations. Two elections would soon alter this political dynamic and stalemate.
The rise of Winston Churchill and Dwight D. Eisenhower brought to power two fierce Cold Warriors, finally creating unity in the Anglo American response to the Iran crisis and fundamentally altering the Western perception and policy. The British government knew that their transatlantic allies would not get on board with a plan that was motivated purely by British oil and economic interests, so instead they emphasized the Communist threat. The US soon concluded that Iran could not resolve the oil crisis and that excessive deficit financing had endangered the nation. Viewing matters from the perspective of Cold War events in Czechoslovakia and Korea, the US feared that Iran would fall behind the Iron Curtain and become a second China.
Hossein Rashtian, 1987
In March 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked his brother Allen Dulles and the newly established Central Intelligence Agency to devise a plan to facilitate Mossadegh’s removal. The British government was ecstatic at having finally achieved American cooperation, and the plan was to be carried out by the CIA and the British Special Intelligence Service. The grandson of Theodore Roosevelt, Kermit Roosevelt, was put in charge, and thus, Operation Ajax was born, opening a long chapter of US covert foreign intervention.
When Kermit Roosevelt entered Iran in July 1953, the country was in a state of turmoil. The political alliance between Mossadegh and Kashani had frayed, violent demonstrations both for and against the prime minister frequently engulfed Tehran, and the prime minister was trying to wrest control of the armed forces from the Shah of Iran. Roosevelt and his team set up at the American Embassy to begin orchestrating a coup d’état. Mr. Roosevelt felt it was necessary to get the rather pliable Shah of Iran to sign two firmans, one dismissing Mossadegh and another appointing General Zahedi as prime minister. On August 13, the Monarch and Queen Soraya flew to an island on the Caspian Sea and the Shah finally signed the firmans. These royal orders would be necessary, Roosevelt figured, in order to give an air of legitimacy to the events about to unfold.
On August 16, the first attempt to dismiss Mossadegh failed and the Colonel in charge was arrested. Mossadegh declared a “military coup” had been foiled and his government charged a large number of military officers with involvement in the coup. As the Shah’s portraits were being removed from government offices, Mossadegh was trying to put an end to the Pahlavi dynasty. News of the developments spread and Washington gave up hope in their operation. Kermit Roosevelt was ordered by cable to leave Iran at the earliest opportunity, but decided to continue, sensing victory around the corner.
Demonstrations once again engulfed the country on August 19, but the pro-Shah groups outnumbered their opponents, and military officers joined in, disobeying Mossadegh’s orders. Certainly some of the demonstrators were galvanized and paid by the United States and Great Britain as part of the operation. The extent of these payments and their consequences remain unclear. Other Operation Ajax expenditures included bribing politicians as well as newspaper editors to publish anti-Mossadegh editorials.
Opponents attacked Mossadegh’s home and he and his guards finally surrendered. Supporters of the monarchy took to the national radio station and announced the successful royal appointment of General Zahedi as Prime Minister. The Shah soon returned to the country and consolidated a new government under his rule that would remain in power for another 25 years.
All the Shah’s Men not only outlines events as they happened, but also captures the response and broader significance. He points out that the perception of the Iranian people is that their country was on a path of development and democracy, one that was thwarted entirely by outside forces acting in their short sighted self interest to plunder a vital natural resource. On the other hand, the view of the American officials at the time was that if they didn’t act decisively, the Soviet Union would have filled a political void and that this was a risk they could not stomach. In 2000, Secretary Madeleine Albright recognized the US involvement in the coup and issued a guarded apology, acknowledging that it set back Iran’s course to democracy. While there is room for debate as to the whether Mossadegh would have politically survived were it not for foreign intervention, perception can be more powerful than reality in this case.
Since Kinzer’s publication of “All the Shah’s Men”, a revisionist account has more recently emerged which makes the point that while the US and UK were certainly involved, their role was by and large inconsequential. Revisionist authors substantiate their claims by pointing to domestic politics in Iran and the fraying of a coalition between Mossadegh and Kashani. Essentially, the nationalist prime minister would have been eventually overthrown with or without foreign involvement, they argue. It would be wise to balance Kinzer’s account along with revisionist accounts published by experts such as Ray Takeyh and Fariborz Mokhtari.
To Iranians, these events are in many ways a woeful tragedy for their broader aspirations. Indeed, Hossein Rashtian’s 1987 painting includes a fereshteh, or angel, gently weeping in the corner.